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ABSTRACT
For most of the post-World War II era, U.S. strategy and military doctrine has 
been focused on a Westphalian notion of endemic conflict between nation-states. 
However, in the post-Cold War world, the use of the military instrument has, more often 
than not, been used to rectify problems internal to states.
Is the post-state level the arena where the U.S. will face its greatest military 
challenge in the coming decades? If so, then military leaders need to shift their analysis 
of nation-states to that of an internal perspective. In addition, if the military instrument of 
power is going to be the method of choice for dealing with state collapse, then political 
decision makers need to understand the capabilities and limitations of military force 
internal to states. This study seeks to address the effectiveness of military action in failed 
states by first, stepping backward and scrutinizing popular concepts of nation-states and 
sub-state linkages and then, analyzing recent military missions in failed states.
Caught Between Nation and State:
An Analysis of Post-Cold War Military Intervention in Failed States
INTRODUCTION
Since the end of World War II, the number of sovereign states in the world has 
grown by a third and in the post-Cold War era the rate of creation of new “countries” has 
increased markedly. This new international order has deprived the formal rivals o f either 
the capacity (the former Soviet Union) or the need (The United States) to uphold 
unpopular or ineffective regimes across the globe. This lessening of international pressure 
has afforded nations, ethnic groups and non-governmental entities the ability to pursue 
sovereignty unfettered by competing superpower demands. Unfortunately, the right of 
self-determination, supported by the international community, has been honored at the 
expense of the more practical aspects of long-term state survivability.1 As regimes are 
increasingly left to their own devices to secure the conditions of their survival, many have 
shown that they are simply not up to the task. The result is a phenomenon becoming 
known as “failed-states” (states characterized by "civil strife, government breakdown and 
economic privation."2) In the present era, the reduced specter of state versus state conflict 
has given rise to the use of the military instrument as the method of choice to be used to 
stabilize, and sometimes rectify, failed state problems. Military missions such as 
peacekeeping, peace-enforcement and humanitarian assistance, all grouped under the 
rubric “military operations other than war” (MOOTW), are military missions which are 
increasingly becoming the norm.
1 Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Ratner, “Saving Failed States,” Foreign Policy 89 (Winter 
1992/1993): 4.
2Ibid., 3.
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In the United States, current strategy and military doctrine is dominated by a state 
versus state context or, in the military vernacular, war-fighting . However, day-to-day 
U.S. military entanglements are increasingly focused on problems internal to nation­
states. Military operations in troubled states are a post-Cold War reality. This basis in 
fact requires that military and political decision makers understand failed-states. As 
General John Sheehan, former Commander in Chief of the United States Atlantic 
Command, succinctly explains: “T see a whole lot of Albanias’ in the future; ‘a whole lot 
o f Haitis and Mogadishus.’”3 The rising number of troubled states with the potential of 
becoming failed states, and their impact on international stability, necessitates a better 
understanding of post-Cold War state dynamics. In addition, more effective political and 
military tools need to be formulated in order to address failed state crises. This study 
seeks to address the effectiveness o f military action in failed states by first, stepping 
backwards and scrutinizing our concept of nation-states and sub-state linkages and then, 
analyzing recent military interventions in the failed states o f Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia. 
Each case study will concentrate on an analysis of the state breakdown, the military 
missions formulated to address the breakdown, and lessons learned from those missions. 
A summary of the common trends in each case may be able to shed light on both the 
potential uses, and realistic limits, o f the military instrument internal to failed states.
2Ibid., 3.
3George C. Wilson, “Deploy Less, Invest More, Sheehan Argues,” Navy Times: Marine Corps 
Edition, 7 April 1997, p. 16.
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FAILED STATE CRISES 1987-1997
Year Place Military Mission
1987 Liberia Political Intervention
1990 Ethiopia Humanitarian Intervention
1992 Somalia Humanitarian Intervention (U.S.)
1993 Rwanda Political Intervention (Belgium)
1994 Haiti Political Intervention (U.S.)
1995 Bosnia Political Intervention (NATO)
1997 Albania Humanitarian Intervention (Italy)
1997 Zaire Security Action (France)
(Table 1)
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SECTION I 
NATIONS, STATES AND STATE FAILURE
The collective American psychology regards the nation-state as a given and a basic 
frame of reference for understanding international politics. Government documents, 
academic journals, and the media typically address international issues at the state level. 
For Americans, and Westerners in general, the nation-state represents a constant in our 
established international equation. Nation-states have been, and remain, the primary 
actors on the international stage. But the reality of the post-Cold War international arena 
has undermined confidence in the viability of nation-states. In the past ten years, the 
viability of particular nation-states has been challenged in countries as diverse as the 
Soviet Union, Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti and Rwanda, to name a few prominent examples. 
Much of this misunderstanding of the intrinsic weakness of states comes from the 
experience of the Cold War - 45 years during which the integrity of nation-states served as 
a fundamental principal of international order. The result was a tendency toward 
reductionism in thinking about international political affairs.
The term nation-state is used liberally in our societal discourse. To most 
Westerners, nation-state conjures up an image such as a France or Japan - a homogenous 
ethnic group under a single sovereign governmental entity. The fact is, while the term 
nation-state is colloquially used in most discourse, few understand its meaning. This 
problem may be endemic to our own language. As Haitian scholar Michel Trouillot points 
out, “unlike romance languages, in English the word nation is often treated as a
5
synonym of state. "4 Thus, from a Western standpoint we not only have a conceptual 
problem but a language problem as well. What do the terms actually mean — nation, state, 
country?
A nation refers to a social or cultural entity comprised of a group of people who 
share a common language, history, ethnic background, religion, or culture, or a 
combination of the above.5 Nations are homogenous populations of some type, not 
physical entities per se, but, more often than not inhabiting a contiguous physical space. A 
good representation of the concept is that of former Native American nations - Iroquois, 
Sioux, Comanche, etc. They were not organized political entities as much as they were a 
collection of people that shared a common cultural or ancestral lineage. Further, 
whichever combination of the above factors forms the basis for the sense o f unity, a nation 
is a community of individuals that have developed a strong emotional bond or sentiment 
towards the larger group. It could be said the group has forged a common identity or a 
sense of "we-ness."6 This “we-ness” can be thought of as anthropological or embedded in 
the collective psychology of a group imprinting a culture upon it. As Senator Patrick 
Moynihan asserts: “The Nation is the ‘highest’ form of the ethnic group, denoting a 
subjective state of mind as regards to ancestry.”7 Individuals tend to identify more with
4Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Haiti: State Against Nation. (New York: Monthly Review Press,
1990), 23.
5Wayne Davidson, “Actors to War and Conflict,” War Conflict and Objectives. (Maxwell, 
Alabama: United States Air Force, Air War College Press, 1996): 2.
6Ibid.
7Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Pandaemonium: Ethnicity in International Politics. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1993). 4.
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their nationality or ethnicity than their government, making nations and nationalism the 
most potent force in the international arena. Thus, nations should be thought of as 
powerful socio-cultural constructs8 or anthropological fields9 which give individuals in a 
population a collective identity.
Our international system is based on the notion of competing states. States, by the 
generally accepted definition, refer to political-legal entities which exercise effective 
control over a distinct territory and population. States are discrete and separate from 
nations, although a single state may govern a single nation. According to Wayne 
Davidson, states possess four primary attributes: territorial integrity, population, 
legitimacy, and internal and external sovereignty.10 Of these attributes, the two critical 
features are legitimacy and internal sovereignty - legitimacy being the collective 
acceptance from the population that allows a state to govern and internal sovereignty the 
ability of a state to control its population. As Max Weber pointed out, States are organs 
of coercion. “[A] state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of 
the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.”11 “States seek to ensure their 
survival.”12 Thus, states achieve legitimacy and internal sovereignty before attending to 
other priorities. In order to maintain legitimacy and sovereignty, states utilize
8Davidson, “Actors to War and Conflict,” 4.
Pierre Bourdieu and Loic J. D. Wacquant, An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology. (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1992): 103.
10Davidson, 5.
11 Weber, Max, “Politics as A Vocation,” in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., From Max 
Weber: Essays in Sociology. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946): 78.
12Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics. (New York: McGraw Hill, Inc., 1979): 91.
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organizations such as those that wield political power (governing institutions), use force 
(militaries and police), and administer justice (laws and courts). National politics tends to 
be the realm of authority, o f administration and of law.13 National and cultural identities 
can shape political institutions but states are still synthetic constructs institutionalized 
within populations. As organizational bodies, states can rise and fall, consolidate or 
fragment, or simply go out o f business or fail, whereas nations rarely do. As the post- 
Cold War experience has reminded us, states are often unstable and ephemeral features in 
the international milieu. In the abstract, they are the accepted operational entities at work 
in the international system. However, individual states should not be thought of as 
constants. If the state system is enduring, the fate of particular states is far less secure. 
Nation states, however, are connected to more lasting (and perhaps more relevant) 
national forces through these fragile linkages.
Nation-states are what we most commonly think of when we refer to actors in the 
international arena. A nation-state is a state whose population is composed from a single 
nation of people. The population identifies the nation and the state as one and the same.
It is conceptually, for many, “an ideal form of state, with all members of a particular nation 
having their own state.”14 States with a cultural homogeneity, such as Japan or the 
Scandinavian states best qualify as true nation states. Yet few scholars agree on a clear 
definition of the concept. For the most part, nation-states are a West-European notion, 
although few states in Westem-Europe are true nation-states. Most states found in the
13Ibid., 113.
14Davidson, 7.
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world today are multi-national states. Multi-national states are those states which govern 
a group of nationalities, cultures or ethnic groups. The more diverse the collection of 
nations or cultures under state control, the less of a common vision of governance will be 
present in the state and therefore the less stability. Additionally, since many multi-nation 
states are the products of great-power treaties, colonial agreements or elite manipulation, 
there may be little state legitimacy. Suffice it to say that the notion of a nation-state is 
often more of an ideal than a practical reality. Most states are multi-national within which 
nations compete for a common vision of state governance. It is generally the case that the 
more nationalities states control, the lower the level of identification with the state.
The two primary internal dynamics which shape states and determine their overall 
survivability are sovereignty and legitimacy. State sovereignty and legitimacy in 
populations and ethnic groups is managed through social linkages. Social linkages are 
established through the mobilization of social power. States form these linkages to 
control populations and, in some instances, the mobilization of social power can give form 
to states themselves. In essence, states can be vehicles in which dynamic social relations 
become institutionalized.15 In other instances, states, such as post-colonial states, can 
layer social power constructs over populations. Social power networks can be manifested 
in many forms; many of them are nationally or culturally dependent. For heuristic 
purposes, Michael Mann has simplified the notion of fields of social power into four 
interrelated groups - ideological power, economic power, military power and political
15Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power. Volume II. The Rise of Classes and Nation States. 
1760-1914. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993): 52.
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power.16 While not comprehensive, it is an analytical point o f entry for dealing with an 
otherwise messy complex structure.17 The point to take away is that, as complex synthetic 
entities, countries must integrate a variety o f social power networks - ideological, 
economic, military or political - in ways that are historically contingent and path- 
dependent or particular to each country’s experience. If the social linkages connecting a 
state to a given nation or population fail, the state will lose its legitimacy and fail. State 
formation, in other words, is an unending process, with the possibility o f failure never far 
over the horizon.
State stability is also affected by external pressures. As Kenneth Waltz has shown, 
bi-polar, or balance of power international systems, can be much more stable than multi­
polar systems. In balance of power systems there is superpower management o f crises 
within spheres of influence. In multi-polar systems, there is less management of the affairs 
o f smaller states since there is no power to balance, per se. In multi-polar systems, 
nationalistic and ethnic forces within the boundaries of states can more easily challenge 
state legitimacy and sovereignty with little loss of territory or resources to competing 
states. In addition, in a multi-polar system with a single superpower, a situation where 
international stability is at a premium, the principle strategic concern of the superpower 
will be to maintain the international status quo and thus uphold a balance of power internal 
to states rather than external. These permissive international dynamics exacerbate internal 
forces which can have a correlative effect on state failure.
16Ibid., 7.
17Ibid., 10.
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The current international environment is causing the erosion of the traditional 
foundations of the state - legitimacy and sovereignty. As Richard Rosecrance points out, 
“there is no doubt today that states’ wherewithal and power has declined.”18 States are 
still capable organizational entities, but in today’s international environment, legitimacy -- 
the principal element of social power ~  has declined. “Legitimacy is under attack from 
nationalism — especially where political boundaries do not conform to national ones.”19 
“Sovereignty is under attack from international sources — international economics, the 
spread o f democracy, new ideologies.”20 The decline in state power has manifested itself 
on the international margins as a phenomenon becoming known as a “failed state.” If  a 
state loses legitimacy through mismanagement of governance, the economy or ideology, 
or loses sovereignty through nationalistic fragmentation, revolt or war, it can fail, or in 
essence, go out of business. The populations or nations that failed-states governed will 
continue to exist but the means of maintaining order (the governing and coercive 
organizations) will stop functioning and in some cases vanish. In many cases, police and 
military organizations exacerbate the failure by essentially becoming bandits, taking 
advantage of instability and disorder to maximize personal gain. In terms of state/nation 
relationships, the networks that Mann identified as the sources of social power — 
ideological power, economic power military and political power -- become disassociated,
18Richard Rosecrance, “Trans-nationalism and the Nation-State,” address presented at the 
symposium: “NATO at the Crossroads: Eyes on the Horizon,” Norfolk, Virginia, 11-12 April 1997.
19Richard Haas, “The Impact of Global and Regional Forces on the Trans-Atlantic Relationship,” 
remarks presented at the symposium: “NATO at the Crossroads: Eyes on the Horizon,” Norfolk, Virginia,
11-12 April 1997.
20Ibid.
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and new organizations or groups compete with former sovereign authorities. Failed social 
linkages, especially economic and coercive, give rise to massive economic privation, 
resource crises, violence and anarchy. Such disorder can rapidly spread from the local to 
the regional level, with potential for international repercussions.
The terms nation, state and nation-state are simple concepts with complicated real- 
world dynamics. In order to understand states and nations each must be viewed as a 
distinct entity, one synthetic, one anthropological, but with a history that is entwined. 
Nations, states and their stability is directly affected by the international environment and 
their internal makeup. In this era, state power no longer conveniently rests on a measure 
of weapons and technology, it rests on a more elusive social base. In a permissive 
international environment that does little to discourage nationalism and other social forces 
or shore up the vital bases of state power — legitimacy and sovereignty -- states fail.
Failed states can give rise to problems of an international scale such as economic 
privation, refugee crises, and genocide. If the key problem is not power, but its opposite - 
- the weakness that follows from a lack of social power — what is the purpose and role of 
military power forces in rebuilding state power? Rather than assume these questions in 
abstract, I will look at three actual cases in which militaiy power was used to address 
humanitarian world order concerns in a context of weak or absent state legitimacy. In the 
conclusion I will generalize the effectiveness of military power in a failed state from the 
lessons learned in each of the cases.
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SECTION II
U.N./U.S. INTERVENTION IN SOMALIA
Thus far it has been observed that the current international environment is 
characterized by an increased tendency toward state failure. In this section we will 
concern ourselves with the use of military power in failed states. If military means are to 
be the method of choice for dealing with failed states, then strengths and weakness of the 
military instrument in these environments must be carefully analyzed. The ideal way to 
approach the subject is through an analysis of recent military actions in troubled states. 
U.S. and coalition military operations in Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia shed important light on 
problems in failed states that can, and cannot, be solved by military means. The cases are 
typical o f states in crisis, and in each case, military power was used with varying degrees 
of success.
Each case will be examined using an analytical model to: (1) assess the dynamics 
o f each (failing) state and define the nature o f the breakdown; and (2) determine the 
conditions affecting the success of military missions formulated to ameliorate the crisis. 
The lessons learned from each case will be amalgamated into a list of tenets which can 
reasonably be used to frame the use of military power in failed states. It is important to 
point out that the debate in this exercise is not centered on the political rationale for 
engagement into failed states. Suffice it to say that major powers can, and do, use military 
force to stabilize troubled states for a wide variety of reasons. It is the effectiveness of 
military engagement, once the political decision has been made to intervene, that we seek 
to investigate.
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Dynamics of the Somalian Crisis
The Somali nation is composed of a culturally, linguistically, and religiously similar 
people divided among six distinct clans or tribes and scattered sparsely over a harsh, dry 
land.21 There is a weak national identity in the population due to the clan system 
identifying with a common ancestor. Three-fifths o f the 7.7 million population is made up 
of regional nomadic or semi-nomadic pastoralists and herders,22 making geographical clan 
identification the strongest cultural force in the nation. Unlike Western states, only ten 
percent of the population, mostly elites, live in the few urban centers. Most o f this small 
urban population lives in the capital, Mogadishu. These urban areas, and their mixed elite 
populations, tend to be marginalized as national centers of gravity due to nomadic 
detachment and regional clan dynamics. The clans are the basic unit of society, serving 
social, political and economic functions.23
Somalia’s history as a state is little different than many other former European 
colonies in Asia and Africa following World War II. Somalia was formed in 1960 by 
combining the former Italian and British colonies in the horn of Africa. It began as an 
idealistic Muslim republic founded by Somalian colonial bureaucratic elites. Somalia’s 
departure from pluralistic state development came after a rocky nine years; in July 1969 a 
coup d’etat ousted the semi-democratic government and Major General Mahammad Siad
21Helen Chapin Metz, ed. Somalia: A Country Study. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1993): 94.
22Ibid., xiv.
23Ibid., 85.
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Barre assumed control o f the country. Barre established a Muslim-Marxist republic and 
governed through a Supreme Revolutionary Council. Barre courted the Soviet Union and 
established Somalia as a Soviet client state for military and economic assistance. In 
addition, he used Marxism to try and build a nation-state identity by attacking the Somali 
clan system through rhetoric, education, and law. He established a homegrown scientific 
socialism which attacked tribalism, not class, in order to build government legitimacy 
among the clans. Unfortunately, the Barre plan only served to undermine what he was 
trying to accomplish. The abolition of political parties and the prohibition of political 
opposition made the clan system the only outlet for political activity.24 Barre’s practice of 
openly favoring the lineages and families of his own clan and distributing rewards and 
government offices to them disproportionately further undermining public support.25 The 
result was the continued undermining of the legitimacy of Barre’s state by an intensive 
identification with sectarian clans. In the final years of Barre’s rule (1985-1990) the 
severe reduction of Soviet aid and “the multiplicity of political rivalries among the 
country’s numerous clans seriously jeopardized Somalia’s continued existence as a unified
. a  t >26state.
The Somalian state collapsed in January of 1991 when repressed non-Barre clans 
militarily mobilized and forcefully deposed Barre. When Barre fled, the government that 
he had filled with family members, the armed forces led by clans he favored, and the
24Ibid., 163.
25Ibid.
26Ibid.
15
bureaucracy staffed by favorites, disintegrated. Not only had Barre’s repressive policies 
undermined the government’s legitimacy, but when rival clans mobilized, he lost the 
monopoly on the legitimate use o f force, the essential condition of any government’s 
existance. Barre’s flight caused a governmental vacuum.27 The clans that advanced into 
Mogadishu had no vision of national governance. Within six months of Barre’s abdication 
and the collapse of his government, the rival clans which had taken Mogadishu began 
fighting amongst themselves. “The result was disintegration of government, civil society, 
and essential services by September of 1991.”28 Media accounts of the situation in 
Somalia during this time frequently used the term “anarchy” to describe the political 
conditions. The Somalian state had failed.
Somalia received international attention in 1992 when, in addition to state collapse, 
massive drought struck the interior of the country. Since government services had ceased 
to function, and internal security had disintegrated, the bulk of the population ~  the 
nomadic pastoral peoples of the interior ~  suffered massive privation and starvation. 
Kenneth Allard of the U.S. National Defense University described the famine as one of 
“Biblical proportions: more than one-half million Somalis had perished of starvation and 
at least a million more were threatened.”29 There were no political or social mechanisms 
to stem the crisis. The situation in urban areas was little better; clan warlords and former
27 Ahmed I. Samatar, “The Curse of Allah: Civic Disembowelment and the Collapse of the State 
in Somalia,” in The Somali Challenge: From Catastrophe to Renewal, ed. Ahmed I. Samatar (London: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994): 120.
28Metz, Somalia: A Country Study : xxx.
29Kenneth Allard, Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned. (Washington, D.C.: National Defense 
University Press, 1995): 13.
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military officers exploited the growing refugee populations and humanitarian aid workers 
brought in to ameliorate the crisis. “Somalia had become a geographical expression rather 
than a country — but whatever it was called the scale of human suffering there had 
captured the attention of the international community.”30
Application of Military Power in Somalia
The scale of state failure in Somalia was total. Layered on top of complete 
government collapse was a multi-factional civil war and a catastrophic humanitarian 
disaster. Superpower interests ~  humanitarian (ending the famine) and leadership 
(bringing together an international stabilization force) — meant that not only did food aid 
need to get to the starving populace, but security and stability needed to be established. In 
the U.S., it was determined by the Bush administration that the American military was the 
only U.S. organization that could bring the requisite scale, organization, structure, 
logistical expertise and security to the anarchy that was Somalia.
The application of military power in Somalia had three distinct phases [see (Table 
2)]: U.N. Operations Somalia I — UNOSOMI (Operation Provide Relief), U.S.
Operation Restore Hope, and U.N Operations Somalia II — UNOSOM II. Provide Relief 
was the bounded international effort under U.N. Security Council Resolution 751. Its 
mission was to provide humanitarian assistance and facilitate the end of hostilities.
Provide Relief is more of a typical humanitarian operation. During Provide Relief
30Ibid.
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Operation______
UNOSOM I 
(Provide Relief)
Restore Hope 
UNOSOM n
tJBRARy
MILITARY OPERATIONS IN SOMALIA 8 ^  Man
_______________Date____________ ________ U.N. Resolution
August - December 1992 UNSCR #751
December 1992 - May 1993 UNSCR #794
May 1993 - March 1994 UNSCR #814
Courtesy: National Defense University
Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned
(Table 2)
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humanitarian aid was delivered to the region but the security situation deteriorated. 
Restore Hope and UNOSOMII better addressed the new challenges of military operations 
in failed states. Each mission had to grapple with the nature of state failure in Somalia — 
the failure of governing and political institutions — and the success of each mission 
depended on how it approached the remaining political framework.
The U.S. military mission for operation Restore Hope as defined by the
Bushadministration to the U.S. Central Command was to.
[C]onduct joint/combined military operations in Somalia to secure the major 
air and sea ports, key installations and food distribution points, to provide 
open and free passage of relief supplies, provide security for convoys and 
relief organization operations, and assist UN/NGO’s in providing relief under 
U.N. auspices.31
Militarily the mission was straightforward. It gave the U.S. military the leeway to use
force to provide necessary security and stability in key areas. The only flaw was the
miscalculation of military involvement in the political structure in order to accomplish the
security mission. The nature of state failure in Somalia left it with no government, no
political or coercive institutions, no social order. When 28,000 armed U.S. troops
appeared in the region they, in essence, became the state. The seemingly simple task of
maintaining security took on a different dimension in the anarchy that was Somalia. The
U.S. Army Forces Somalia, After Action Summary captures the difficult dimension of
providing security in a failed state:
In order to get military forces out of the security business, local security 
forces must function once again. In order to establish these security forces 
some type of local council or “government” must exist. Therefore our forces
31Kenneth Allard, Somalia Operations. 16.
19
were very closely tied to assisting in the establishment of local councils and 
facilitating the establishment of local council’s police forces.32
Clarity of mission and purpose was essential in order to keep the U.S. military in Somalia
from being drawn into the political struggle in the failed country. Restore Hope managed
to keep a fairly clear differentiation between the military and political tasks to be
accomplished in Somalia. In turn, by most accounts, the U.S. military operation was
deemed as generally successful in halting the fighting and increasing the amount of
humanitarian aid that reached the population in the rural areas of the country.33 Thus, the
U.S. approach of sidestepping the political framework and limiting military missions and
tasks to those suited to military forces helped control some of the anarchy in the former
Somalia.
The post-U.S. United Nations mission labeled UNOSOMII fell into the pitfall of 
trying to rebuild the governing framework with military forces, which, as Kenneth Allard 
points out, is “an exercise akin to nation-building.”34 The immediate difference between 
the U.S. and U N operation was mission scope. The key differences are evident in U.N. 
Security Council Resolution #814 where:
- The Council mandated the first ever U.N.-directed peacekeeping operation 
under the Chapter VII enforcement provisions of the Charter, including the 
requirement for UNOSOMII to disarm the Somali clans.
- It explicitly endorsed the objective of rehabilitating the political institutions 
and economy of a member state.
32Department of the U.S. Army, U.S. Army Forces. Somalia. 10th Mountain Division. After 
Action Summary. (Fort Drum, New York: Headquarters, 10th Mountain Division, 1993): 49.
33Diehl, International Peacekeeping. 186.
34 Allard, 18.
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- It called for the building of a secure environment throughout the country, 
including the northern region that had declared its independence.35
The U.N. mission in Somalia was labeled as a peacekeeping mission, but it was in fact a
far broader effort. The missions of disarmament and political rehabilitation greatly
complicated the achievable military missions of humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping.
These missions violated the canon of neutrality which is the centerpiece of a peacekeeping
strategy.36 In addition, the “absence of government authority not only means that there
are no viable structures on which to build a peace settlement, but the actors who
participate in the negotiations are less defined.”37 Predictably, as U.N. forces became
involved in the political dynamic o f the warring clans, violent action toward peacekeeping
forces increased. Peacekeepers, especially from major powers such as the U.S. and Italy,
were seen as Western foreign invaders.38 This politicization of the peacekeeping forces
compromised the basic missions of providing humanitarian assistance and security to the
Somali population and resulted, after significant violence, in the reduction of great power
support for the mission.
Military Lessons Learned
Post-mission analysis and After Action Reviews showed that the U.S. operation 
with its limited humanitarian and security objectives achieved relative success achieving
35Ibid.
36Diehl, 188.
37Ibid„ 189.
38 Allard, 189.
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tasks to stabilize the environment. The U.S. mission was clear, achievable and within the 
scope of military forces. Still, even with a clear military mission, U.S. Army After Action 
reviews highlighted the problem of U.S. military forces becoming immersed in political 
problems — the true nature of state failure in Somalia. The lack of a political solution and 
the application of political instruments against the anarchy in Somalia (e.g. a coherent plan 
amongst civilian agencies) meant that U.S. military solutions would be topical at best.
In contrast, the U.N mission with its capacious use of military force for a political 
mission was less successful. The U.N. overestimated the ability of a peacekeeping military 
force to reestablish institutions and disarm warring factions. In defining the limits of 
military action in humanitarian and peacekeeping operations, Kenneth Allard describes 
those “bright lines” where the limits o f military force are being reached: “One of them 
involves the use of military forces for nation-building, a mission for which our forces 
should not be primarily responsible. While military forces may well set the stage for such 
action, the real responsibility for nation-building must be carried out by the civilian 
agencies of the government.”39 Also, in reference to the U.N. mission of disarming the 
warring factions: “If the disarmament of the population becomes an objective, then there 
should be no mistaking the fact that the troops given this mission have been committed to 
combat.”40
A comparison between the two operations highlights the success of the U.S. 
mission which was more in concert with the militarily achievable facets o f state breakdown
39Ibid., 90.
40Ibid.
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in Somalia. The primary task at hand for military forces was the stopping the famine and 
mitigating the humanitarian catastrophe. The U.S. mission addressed this problem while 
sidestepping the Somalian political framework. The U.N mission addressed the political 
problem head on, but failed to take into account the fact that military forces would have 
little effect in altering the fundamental absence of government legitimacy. By trying to 
reconstruct, with limited military forces, a popular base of support for a national state in 
Somalia, the U.N. mission was doomed to failure. The irony is that the U.N. and its 
member nations were encouraged by the initial U.S. success in Somalia but failed to 
realize that those successes were due to limited application of military power, not due to 
the overwhelming capability of military action.
Another important pattern to be considered, as we shall see in the other case 
studies, is the phased structure of military operations in Somalia (Table 2 - UNOSOM I  
through UNOSOM II.) The operational phases I and II (UNOSOM I  and Restore Hope) 
were more successful than phase III (UNOSOMII). This lack of success in phase III can 
be partly attributed to the political dynamic of the UNOSOM II  mission, but this phased 
trend also highlights the difficulty of transitioning from immediate, topical military 
problems to stickier political ones. As seen in the distinct phases and missions, military 
forces can be vital in ending violent social conflict and humanitarian disasters, but 
successful exit from a failed state will require an effective longer-term political solution in 
concert with the nature of state failure. Unfortunately the attempted U.N. political 
solution and accompanying military mission married the wrong tools to the right task.
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Measuring effectiveness of a particular military operation in a failed state centers 
on the concept of stabilization of the environment. Stabilization is the consistent theme in 
U.S. military doctrine on peace operations and operations other than war.41 Stabilization 
in an anarchic situation can have many facets but can only be successfully accomplished by 
identifying and applying force to destabilizing forces. In a failed state this would mean 
applying political, military, and economic instruments o f power against forces 
exacerbating state failure. Each instrument of power has a limited range of available tools 
to bring to bear in a certain situation. In Somalia, government breakdown due to friction 
between sub-national clan rivalries, compounded by famine, defined the nature of the 
failed state and resulting anarchy. As was evident in the U.S. and U.N. missions, applying 
military force to solve problems within the scope of military forces ~  staying the famine — 
were successful, while applying military force to rectify political problems — reestablish 
government institutions or sort out clan rivalries — were unsuccessful. As this case has 
shown, military power is an inappropriate tool for building social power, but is an 
indispensable tool for establishing the environment within which political measures can be 
successful.
41 United States Joint Warfighting Center. Joint Task Force Commander’s Handbook for Peace
Operations. (Norfolk, Virginia: OC Inc. 1997): 1-9.
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SECTION m
U.S./U.N. INTERVENTION IN HAITI
The tortured past of the Haitian nation gives great insight into the failure of the 
Haitian state in the twentieth century. The Republic of Haiti, formerly Saint-Domingue -- 
the richest, most coveted colony in the French colonial empire42 — contains a population 
of more than 5 million descendants of former African slaves. The theme of Haitian history 
and culture is one of exploitation. Even though the nation rebelled against French colonial 
rule in 1791 becoming the world’s first black republic, “[t]he slaveholding system had 
established the efficacy of violence and coercion in controlling others, and the racial 
prejudice inherent in the colonial system survived.”43 The exploitive French colonial 
system left a nation divided between a black peasant class (noirs) and a light skinned elite 
(blancs) who wield a disproportionate share of the political and economic power.44 In 
addition, the country’s legacy of slavery and French colonization left a cultural imprint of 
which members of the Haitian upper class cherished Franco-Haitian culture because 
French language and manners separated them from the masses they wished to rule.45 This 
divided national existence consistently undermined the mechanisms and institutions of a 
functional civil society. Consequently, Haitian history is replete with class-based and race-
42Richard A. Haggerty, ed. Dominican Republic and Haiti: country studies. (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991): 206.
43Ibid., 203.
44Ibid.
45Ibid., 241.
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based turmoil and struggle; a dysfunctional nation trapped in an exploitive political 
mechanism.
Haiti’s troubled political history mirrors its exploitationist colonial roots. Haitian
political development was continually arrested due to foreign influence and internal
corruption. After throwing off the brutal yoke of the French colonial administration, early
governments were manipulated and overthrown by outside powers such as Spain, Britain,
Germany and the United States, in addition to continued meddling by France. Further, the
division between elites and peasants exacerbated problems in state development as
competing economic priorities -- elites insisting that peasants produce commodities for the
world market and peasants who wished to be left alone to grow foodstuffs46 ~  tore at the
notions o f a representative political system. Elites continually backed charismatic leaders
that maintained the social and economic status quo which peasants periodically displaced
through rebellion and violence. This chaotic and personalistic nature of Haitian political
culture provided fertile ground for a succession of despots, strongmen, and dictators.47
The trend continued throughout the twentieth century until the Duvalier dictatorship was
broken in 1986 and a fledgling representative government established. While the
democratically elected government was the first step in functional state development, the 
»
lack of developed democratic institutions undermined the future of a democratic Haitian 
state. The republican state, due to colonial legacy, foreign influence, and class/race 
conflict, never developed the political and social linkages needed to attach the state to the
46Paul Farmer, The Uses of Haiti. (Monroe, Maine: Common Courage Press, 1994): 74.
47Haggerty, 203.
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nation. As Haitian historian Michel Trouillot argues, Haiti was the epitome of a “State 
Against Nation,” never functioning on a social-political level.
In September of 1991, the Haitian state failed when the progressive fledgling 
government of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide was deposed by an elite backed coup.
The economic elite of Haiti feared that their wealth and privileges would be taken away by 
the Aristide government. Seeking protection from this threat of expropriation, they 
sponsored a conservative military coup. The U.S. press defined the coup as repressive, 
thus defining the perception of right and wrong to the U.S. public and U.S. policy makers. 
The United States, along with the Organization of American States, responded to the coup 
by imposing an international trade embargo.48 Government exploitation coupled with the 
trade embargo caused massive privation among the peasant population and gave rise to a 
refugee crisis in which “30,000 Haitians fled across the border to the Dominican Republic, 
while 40,000 others boarded rickety boats and tried to sail to Miami.”49 The military 
government had no way to respond to this situation other than to give up power. The 
state of Haiti had failed its people for the fifth time this century and, as per Haitian history, 
it would take either internal violence or outside intervention to return stability to the 
island.
Application of Military Power in Haiti
The realization that Haiti, with the Cedras military regime in place, would become
48Louis Ortmayer and Joanna Flinn, “Hamstrung Over Haiti: Returning the Refugees.” Pew Case 
Studies in International Affairs. Washington, D.C.: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy Publications,
1994: 1.
49Ibid.
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MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI
Operation_________
Uphold Democracy
MNF - Haiti
UNMEH
Date_____________________ U.N. Resolution
Sept. 1994 - January 1995 UNSCR #940
January - March 1995 UNSCR #940
March 1995 - January 1998 UNSCR#940
Courtesy: United States Atlantic Command 
Operation Uphold Democracy: 
US Forces in Haiti
(Table 3)
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a long-term human rights dilemma for the United States made military solutions an 
increasing strategic necessity. Yet, due to experience in Somalia, it was realized that a 
military solution would be topical and not rectify the intractable problems of the failed 
state. From this vantage, the National Security Council established an interagency 
working group (IWG) that “brought together representatives from all government 
agencies involved in the planning and policy development process for Haiti.”50 This forum 
allowed coordinated political-military planning and had members from Departments of 
State, Defense, Justice, Treasury as well as from the Defense Intelligence Agency and the 
Central Intelligence Agency.51 Unfortunately, the working group never arrived at a 
coordinated, objective driven political-military policy,52 but its creation marked an 
important realization — that while the military could achieve the goal o f establishing and 
maintaining a safe and secure environment, in essence, assuming the monopoly on the use 
of force and stabilizing the environment, civilian agencies could formulate programs and 
policy to address the longer term solutions needed to reconstruct the state. Thus, even 
though the interagency process for Haiti did not arrive a complete political solution prior 
to the application of military force, the post—Somalia awareness that political solution was 
required at all was an important benchmark.
The military mission in Haiti, like in Somalia, can be divided into three distinct 
phases: Operation Uphold Democracy — the initial U.S. military intervention in Haiti,
50United States Atlantic Command, Commander-in-Chief. Operation Uphold Democracy: US 
Forces in Haiti (Norfolk, Virginia: O.C. Inc., 1997): 6.
51 Ibid., 7.
52Ibid., 8.
29
Multi-National Force Haiti (MNF Haiti) -- a U.S. led multi-national coalition set up after a
secure environment was established, and the United Nations Mission Haiti (UNMIH)
which took over from MNF Haiti after a stable and secure environment was established.
The initial U.S. military mission dictated by the Clinton administration to the Commander
of the United States Atlantic Command via the U.S. Joint Staff, was to:
[U]se military force in Haiti to establish a safe and secure environment that 
would permit the re-establishment of the legitimate government of President 
Aristide. Other tasks were to neutralize the Haitian Army (FAd’H) and to 
protect American citizens.53
The challenge of the military mission was that, even though it was limited in scope —
establish a safe and secure environment and neutralize the Haitian Army — it still
displaced the, albeit dysfunctional, military government in Port au Prince. This meant that
the U.S. military became the de facto government until Aristide was returned to power
and new government were institutions created. To keep the mission from creeping into a
nation building program in Haiti, initial goals of military commanders after displacing the
Haitian military regime were to immediately “establish civil-military operations”54 to
reorganize those government institutions which the military could effect — the army and
police. In addition, in order to limit military involvement to attainable objectives, defined
end states were dictated for turn-over to the Multi-National/United Nations Force
(dependent on threat) at either 30, 45 or 180 days. The limiting of the military mission to
those aspects of security and stability that military forces could provide, and the definition
53Ibid., 2.
54Ibid.
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of end states for military operations in the failed state, made U.S. military operations in 
Haiti less tractable than those in Somalia. U.S. military intervention in Haiti had a clearer 
conception of the need for a civilian solutions to political problems and gave rise to a more 
successful employment of military power in the failed Haitian state.
The mission of the U.S. led Multi-National Force differed little from that of the 
original U.S. Joint Task Forces involved in the initial intervention. The U.S. formulated 
mission dictated a continuation of the safe and secure environment in Haiti as well as the 
facilitation of the return of the legitimate government to Haiti and the professionalization 
of Haitian public security forces. It was also charged with transitioning government 
services from the military to the government of Haiti.55 The mission of the multi-national 
force is unique in that the MNF was challenged with returning authority and institutions 
back to the legitimate government. Aside from police forces, there was no charter for 
institution building in Haiti. The military objective was viewed as creating a stable 
environment for Haitian institutions to resuming functioning,56 not to take over functions 
from Haitian institutions. The U.N mission in Haiti continued in this vein, more than likely 
due to the legacy of initial U.S. command of both the MNF and U.N mission. Thus, 
unlike Somalia, as the military mission in Haiti transition from U.S. to MNF to U.N., the 
mission remained relatively constant. This resulted in a relatively successful military 
program in maintaining a stable and secure environment in Haiti as the democratically 
Haitian government of President Aristide reestablished itself.
55 United States Atlantic Command, Commander-in-Chief. Operation Uphold Democracy: Joint
After Action Report (JAAR) (Norfolk, Virginia: U.S. Atlantic Command, 1995): 23.
56United States Atlantic Command. Operation Uphold Democracy: US Forces in H aiti: 19.
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Military Lessons Learned
Unlike Somalia, the nature of state failure in Haiti was less anarchy and
government breakdown than dysfunction. In terms of a U.S. Army war college study,
Haiti was a “Predatory state,”57 one in which the state abused its legitimate use of force.
The most important lesson from the intervention in Haiti was the realization that in order
to address the state dysfunction, a coordinated political-military solution to the crisis
needed to be defined prior to intervention. The interagency effort, a first for engagement
in a failed state, was one of the most significant changes in policy formulation during this
type of crisis. Even though the interagency process did not produce an effective political
plan to deal with state failure in Haiti, the fact that an interagency effort was attempted
proved that policymakers were becoming aware of the limitations of strictly limited
military solutions. The closing comment of the U.S. Atlantic Command synopsis on
mission planning and execution in Haiti acknowledged this change:
Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY for the first time integrated political, 
military, and economic planning through an IWG [interagency working group] 
that developed a plan to assist Haiti. Although this was the first step, it fell 
short of its goal and highlighted the need for an interagency structure based on 
accountability of all the participants and a formal process to ensure the 
execution of planning efforts for the successful attainment of US goals and 
objectives.58
The application of military power, regardless of the environment, must be led by political 
power. Clausewitz’s maxim that military force is “the continuation of state policy with
57Max Manwaring, “The Challenge of Haiti’s Future,” Strategic Studies Institute Special Report.
(Fort Levenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army War College Press, 1997): 3.
S8United States Atlantic Command. Operation Uphold Democracy: 61.
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other means”59 still holds true. A clear political strategy must always lead the application 
of military power. The interagency effort is essential in focusing instruments of power to 
be used against the anarchy and to formulate a longer-term political plan. As seen in Haiti, 
the military can stabilize the environment (for a time actually become the state), provide 
security, open lines of communication and facilitate the distribution of resources, but the 
long-term stability of the new government, the economy and social institutions were 
outside of the scope of the military’s capabilities and ultimately remained the responsibility 
of other U.S. government organizations and the United Nations.60
The success of the military mission in Haiti can be directly attributed to the clear 
and specific nature of the mission and objectives and their correlation to the nature of state 
failure in Haiti. As concluded in the United States Atlantic Command overview of the 
Operations in Haiti: “A clearly defined mission with attainable objectives and an exit 
strategy is critical.”61 In other words, the military mission in Haiti, through U.S., MNF 
and U.N. control remained a measurable, achievable concept with formulated for military 
forces. The mission did not force military forces to take sides between rival factions, 
rebuild state institutions (with the exception of law enforcement), or administer justice.
The military mission was carefully crafted so that the military instrument did not, in the 
long-term, become the state — a difficult task since the nature of state failure in Haiti was 
the abuse of the legitimate use of force. Planners compensated for the displacement of
59Carl Von Clausewitz, On War. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds., (Princeton, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 1984): 81.
U n ited  States Atlantic Command. Operation Uphold Democracy: 19.
61 Ibid., 60.
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Haitian civil authority by U.S. military authority by programming in the phasing out of 
U.S. only operations and the phasing in of multi-national troops. A Haitian government in 
exile ready to reassume power also helped formulate a less intractable military end-state.
Integrated attempts to formulate a political solution and a definable military 
mission all contributed to the initial success of the U.S. intervention in Haiti. However, 
the lack of an adequate long-term political and economic plan for Haiti has dimmed the 
prospects for the republic’s stability. Haiti presents an excellent example of why a 
long-term political plan is imperative prior to military engagement. Like in Somalia, the 
three phases of the Haitian operation from Restore Democracy to UNMIH demonstrate 
that military forces can quickly establish order and temporarily provide some services, a 
longer-term political solution is needed to insure the elements which caused the 
dissolution of the state are placated and refocused on establishing domestic order.
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SECTION IV
U.N./NATO INTERVENTION IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA
Since the treaty of Versailles ending the First World War, the ethnic cocktail that 
made up the state of Yugoslavia was always inherently unstable. Not only were there 
competing ethnic groups under a single state, but there was a volatile religious and cultural 
dynamic as well. In addition, the division of Yugoslavia into distinct republics, or semi­
states doomed its success. From the 1940s through the 1980s, the coalition Yugoslavian 
government, with its separate republics, functioned under the Cold War fear of Soviet 
intervention. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the international order that held 
together the Yugoslav state began to unravel.62 “Normal political conflicts over economic 
resources between central and regional governments and over the economic and political 
reforms of the debt-repayment package became constitutional conflicts and crises of state 
itself.”63 Slovenes and Croats, objecting to the Serb-dominated communist government in 
Belgrade, wanted to begin Westem-style democratic reforms and market economies. Both 
Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence from the Federal Peoples Republic of 
Yugoslavia in order to align with the Western powers. After brief and bloody fighting, the 
federal government in Belgrade let ethnic Slovenia and Croatia go.
62Woodward, Susan L., Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War 
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995): 16.
63Ibid., 15.
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Bosnia-Herzegovina, the republic at the crossroads of each cultural and religious 
group, did not go as peacefully as Slovenia and Croatia. When Bosnia-Herzegovina 
declared its independence from the disintegrating Yugoslavian state, the republic 
immediately split along ethnic lines. The population, which consisted of an urban elite 
Muslim majority numbering 44 percent, a working class Orthodox Christian Serbian 
segment of 33 percent and a Catholic Creation western population in the order o f 17 
percent,64 went their separate ways. However, “[ejthnic differences, even substantial 
differences, do not set a society inexorably toward a path of war.”65 Resource 
competition, weak state institutions, and lack of vision of governance all tore at the 
political fabric of the Bosnia state. When the Muslim-led government in Sarajevo failed to 
establish a vision of governance that would satisfy all of the ethnic groups in the region, 
particularly the Bosnian Serbs, it lost legitimacy and war broke out in the province. Much 
of the violence stemmed from the Bosnian Serbs' desire to establish a Serbian state from 
the patchwork of Serbian land that dotted Bosnia. But there were other dynamics at play 
as well — rich and poor, urban and rural, elites and non-elites. As the fighting escalated, 
political institutions collapsed, military and police organizations demobilized and took up 
arms with competing groups, and social institutions broke down. The Muslim-led 
government lost legitimacy among the non-Muslim population. Bosnia-Herzegovina 
ceased to be able to manage its population and was racked by violence and internal war.
^United States Department of Defense, Bosnia Country Handbook (DQD-1540-16-96). 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995): 2-4.
65Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: 18.
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MILITARY OPERATIONS IN BOSNIA 
______________Date_____________________ U.N. Resolution
UN Protection Force I
UN Protection Force II 
(NATO Air Support)
NATO IFOR
January 1992 - March 1993 
March 1993 - Dec. 1995
Dec. 1995 - Dec. 1996 
(Table 4)
UNSCR #743 
UNSCR #743
UNSCR #1031
37
Application of Military Power in Bosnia
The application of military power in Yugoslavia began under the auspices of the
U.N. Protection Force which was designed to separate warring factions in Croatia and
Serbia. The mission migrated to the problems in Bosnia-Herzegovina where it was
quickly overwhelmed and, in fact, became a liability when NATO began airstrikes to
protect safe areas. When NATO finally put forces on the ground it was under the U.S.
brokered Dayton Peace Accords which divided Bosnia into two separate entities under
one state. A 60,000 man NATO force formed around a core o f20,000 U.S. troops would
be the military instrument used to bring order to the failed state. The Dayton Peace
Agreements, while not presenting a completely satisfactory political solution, presented a
political framework upon which a peaceful military entry could be accomplished. Lessons
learned in Somalia and Haiti -- to have a clear political vision and end-state before
committing military forces -- were beginning to have an effect on military operations in
failed states. The NATO military mission in Bosnia is by far one of the clearest and most
specific of the three studied thus far. The mission of NATO intervention force (IFOR), as
dictated by the NATO Security Council, was broken down as follows:
[M]onitor and enforce compliance with the military aspects of the Peace 
Agreement. UNSCR 1031 provides the mandate for a one-year IFOR mission 
as described in the agreement. The North Atlantic Council has authorized 
IFOR for this period. The military tasks include:
- Ensuring self defense and freedom of movement.
- Supervising selective marking of boundaries and Zone of Separation (ZOS) 
between the parties.
- Monitoring and~if needed—enforcing the withdrawal of forces to their 
respective territories, and the establishment of Zones of Separation.
38
- Assuming control of the airspace over Bosnia-Herzegovina and of the 
movement of military traffic over key ground routes.
- Establishing Joint Military Commissions, to serve as the central bodies 
for all Parties to the Peace Agreement.
- Assisting with the withdrawal o f UN forces not transferred to IFOR.66
As seen before, the key components of a successful mission were built into the IFOR 
charter. Namely, (1) the mission was based around supporting the political framework of 
the Dayton Accords, (2) it was achievable — it married military capabilities with military 
tasks, (3) it was objective driven — it established six primary, measurable military 
objectives that were to be the focus of the effort, (4) lastly, it was limited in scope and 
time - it did not try to rebuild the Bosnian state and only supported the political agreement 
for a period of one year. These components have helped prevent the mission creep that 
was seen in Somalia and, to some extent, Haiti.
The jury is still out on the overall success of the IFOR mission. NATO forces are 
still engaged in Bosnia under the new NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) arrangement. It 
is uncertain whether Bosnia will come apart again when NATO military forces leave in the 
near future. Still, the intervention in Bosnia has been, by far, the most effective o f the 
three case studies analyzed. At this point, all timetables for disarmament have been 
scrupulously honored and specific goals have been met. As journalists Laura Silber and 
Allan Little chronicle: “The results were tangible. Within the first two months, the 
warring sides met the deadline to pull back from the zones of separation. After more than 
four years o f war, tens of thousands of people killed, and more than two million made
U nited  States Department of Defense, Fact Sheet: The Role of IFOR in the Peace Process 
(Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1996): 1.
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homeless, there was no more shelling, no more fighting.”67 Thus, in terms of mission 
accomplishment, IFOR was more successful than operations in Somalia, and to a limited 
degree, Haiti. IFOR did not get into the intractable position of trying to reestablish 
political institutions in Bosnia, nor was it required to economically rehabilitate the former 
state. The tangible military objectives of order, freedom of movement and the withdrawal 
of factions proved to be what was needed in order to bring a small window of stability to 
the troubled landscape. This stability has created an environment of basic security within 
which development of the political and economic solutions which are the real keys to long 
term peace in the region.
Military Lessons Learned
Thus far U.S. political and military engagement in Bosnia can be considered a 
success. With the exception of the humanitarian crisis, Somalia seems no better off than 
when the U.S. became involved in 1992. And Haiti, while a military success, seems to be 
sinking back into economic ruin. When compared to the situation in Bosnia three years 
ago, there appears to be much progress. This success can be attributed to the element of 
stability that the NATO military force has brought to the region. But as we have seen, 
stability brought by intervening military forces can be fleeting.
Through each case study, the development of a political solution for the failed 
state crisis proved to be a key factor in the overall success of the entire mission, both 
political and military. As we have seen there was no political framework and little clarity
67Laura Silber and Alan Little. Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation. (New York: Penguin Books, 
1997): 377-8.
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over the desired end state in Somalia, thus the lack of direction and failure of the mission 
in Mogadishu. In Haiti, a political solution was attempted but never got much farther than 
the planning stage, thus the continued political and economic problems in Haiti. In 
Bosnia, the Dayton Accords, for all of their uncertainty, have provided a framework from 
which to build a semblance of stability and peace. Hence, at least from a surface 
perspective, the Dayton framework was critical in ensuring the success of the military 
component of the mission.
Of three military operations analyzed in this paper, the IFOR mission in Bosnia 
was, by far, the most detailed and specific concerning the application of military force in 
troubled states. Much of this success can most likely be attributed to the involvement of a 
significant number of U.S. forces and the collective lessons learned from previous 
engagements in failed states. The IFOR mission was centered on ensuring the success of 
the political framework by providing those aspects of security and stability that a military 
force could offer. While the verdict is not in on the overall success of political 
engagement in Bosnia, the military aspect of the mission must be considered a substantial 
success.
Military success in Bosnia stems from the fact that a broader political framework 
was worked out in before the decision was made to commit NATO military forces on the 
ground. Policy makers and military planners appear to be learning some lessons from the 
recent spate of engagement abroad. In Bosnia, this was translated into the formulation of 
a long-term political framework ~  the Dayton accords -- upon which an achievable, 
objective driven military mission could be formed. Many may not like the political
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solution arrived at in Dayton, but a political solution will always be required prior to the 
engagement of a military forces in order to define what they are supposed to accomplish.
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SECTION V
SUCCESSFUL APPLICATION OF MILITARY POWER IN FAILED STATES
When global interests dictate engagement in troubled states, the lesson of previous 
engagements are invaluable. As the Atlantic Command review of Operation Uphold 
Democracy succinctly points out: “Lessons learned in Grenada and Panama had a 
significant influence on the resulting [Haiti] plans.”68 Understanding the capabilities and 
limitations o f military force in military operations other than war are fundamental when 
engaging in operations in failed states. The three recent case studies highlighted the 
benefits and pitfalls of military operations other than war in an anarchic failed state 
environment. From these case studies there are several lessons which resonate through 
the entire set. These lessons can be summed up in five tenets for military engagement in 
failed states.
Five Tenets of Military Operations in Failed States
I» Approach the situation outside of a nation-state framework
Despite the prevailing conception, the viability of particular states is not to be 
taken as a given. Nation-states are fragile frameworks o f socio-political linkages and 
institutions that provide varying degrees of order and stability over a given populace. It 
has been evident in the post-Cold War era, when the international system loosens, history 
“returns” and states falter, break and come apart. Understanding the nations, tribes and 
ethnicities that underlie most states is the challenge of the post-Cold War policy maker
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and military planner. When states come apart the institutions and trappings o f the state 
fall with it. From a political-military standpoint, it is often useless to try to solve a failed 
state crisis through the institutions of the former regime. The frame of reference needs to 
be refocused to that of the population and its anthropological underpinnings such as 
national, ethnic, and tribal identities. By reducing the frame of reference below the level 
of the state, a definitive, neutral political and military solution can be applied.
II. Engage under a clear political plan
A political solutions to problems in a failed state must take precedence over 
military engagement. While military engagement in failed states can bring quick order and 
stability, political plans to transition the region to a certain, stable end-state must take 
priority. Long-term stabilization and institution building requires a political blueprint. As 
was seen in Haiti, even with an interagency working group, there was no clear conception 
of, or arrangement for, a desired political end state. This made the transition of military 
authority to that of other governmental agencies and to local civil authority less than clear, 
the upshot being the continued engagement, albeit limited, of U.S. military forces to this 
day. As in Bosnia, political solutions such as Dayton, even if limited, provide the 
foundation upon which successful military missions are built. Without a political 
framework, military engagement will only be topical and not provide any long term 
corrections to the anarchy of a failed state.
PI. Focus military missions on tasks relevant to military forces
Military missions must focus on those tasks that can be accomplished by military 
units. Providing security, opening lines of communication and rebuilding minor parts of a
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county’s infrastructure are examples of missions that are achievable by military forces. 
Rebuilding governmental institutions, whether entire governments as in Somalia, or police 
forces as in Haiti are not appropriate military missions; military units lack the training and 
the expertise to accomplish these types of programs. Nation-building type missions are 
better suited to other governmental or non-governmental agencies and should be ruled out 
as military functions during mission development. Military units can accomplish much, 
especially when instruments of order and coercion are needed, but, as seen in Somalia, the 
improper, or inadequate, application of military force can have negative effect on the 
problem at hand.
IV. Establish concrete military objectives
The primacy of the objective is the core doctrinal tenet of the United States 
military. It is the center piece o f the United States Department of Defense Doctrine for 
Joint Operations where it states: “a clearly defined and obtainable objective is critical when 
the United States is involved in military operations other than war.”69 Mission driven 
objectives should be specific, measurable and achievable. They should be limited in scope 
and limited in time. Of the case studies analyzed, missions that did not have clear 
objectives, such as UNOSOMII, suffered from a lack of focus and overall 
accomplishment. When the objectives were detailed, measurable and limited in scope and 
time, such as in Bosnia, there was a higher level of mission accomplishment and overall 
mission success. The definition of clear mission objectives in any military operation is 
fundamental to mission success. In the anarchic environment of a failed state, where the
69Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations. 
(Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1995): V-2.
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military threats are less certain and the political tasks more complicated, clear objectives 
are a necessity.
V. Stabilization of the environment for a broader purpose
In the anarchy of a failed state, the primary task of an outside military organization 
will always be providing for some type of stability so that broader political and economic 
reforms can be enacted. As stated in the United States Joint Warfighting Center 
Handbook for Peace Operations: “Principally, peace operations are designed to create or 
sustain the conditions in which political and diplomatic activities may proceed.”70 As we 
have seen, missions areas which directly address stabilizing the environment ~  famine 
relief in Somalia, disarmament in Haiti, and separating warring parties in Bosnia -- are the 
most successful. Thus, the military commander in a failed state environment must never 
lose sight of the primary goal of providing stability so that broader political and economic 
plans may be accomplished.
Post-Cold War Truisms
The above tenets can provide a broad frame of reference when entering into 
planning for operations in failed state. A sixth tenet could easily be to plan for a transition 
to multi-national, or United Nations authority. In each case study, the use of coalitions, be 
they United Nations, multi-national, or NATO forces, have always led and followed 
unilateral engagement in a failed state. As shown by the case studies, phased mission
70United States Joint Warfighting Center. Joint Task Force Commander’s Handbook for Peace 
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approaches are the operational reality. Post-Cold War, unilateral operations, especially 
peace operations, are rare. Planning for coalition operations, or the transition to coalition 
operations, should always be a consideration when establishing a political-military 
framework for a failed state.
Military operations in the anarchic environment of a failed state will always be 
accompanied by the “friction” and “fog of war” so aptly described by Clausewitz. Military 
operations other than war place unique demands on military forces — demands not 
normally associated with traditional warfighting roles. In an article on joint doctrine and 
Post-Cold War Military Intervention, Steven Drago explains that “it is evident that long­
term political goals can be extremely difficult to translate into well-defined and readily 
attainable military objectives. . .the challenge is to select appropriate military actions to 
support political ends.”71 Viewing the problems in a failed state outside of a nation-state 
framework, developing political solutions and end states, articulating military missions and 
planning for coalition operations are a few of the key necessities prior to the engagement 
of military forces. The formulation of the critical military component o f missions and 
objectives can only be built on the firm foundations of the desired political solution. An 
up-front political solution for a failed state is the only way for a military force not to 
become caught between nation and state.
71 Steven R. Drago, “Joint Doctrine and Post-Cold War Military Intervention.” Joint Force 
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